Thomas Scharping
Minorities, Majorities and National Expansion:
The History and Politics of Population Development in Manchuria 1610-1993

Abstract: This is the extended version of a study published elsewhere in 2000. It pursues the population history of Manchuria and its integration into the Chinese empire from the beginnings of the Manchu state in the early 17th century to the Chinese reform era of the late 20th century. The study introduces the various administrative arrangements that first prevented and later promoted the colonization of the region by Chinese settlers. They have also guided the procedures for collecting and organizing population figures. It then turns to problems of historical demography and ethnic identity, among them different assimilation processes and issues in the classification of national minorities. This is followed by an investigation of the demographic development of the region’s nationalities, as well as the political and socio-economic factors playing a role. The last part discusses Chinese, Russian, Japanese and Korean in-migration. The study includes nine tables with ethno-specific data on population composition and dynamics, migration, educational attainment and employment structure of the region.

Key words: Population history, migration, national minorities, regional administration, assimilation, educational attainment, employment structure, Manchuria

Author: Thomas Scharping (t.scharping@uni-koeln.de) is Professor for Modern Chinese Studies, Chair for Politics, Economy and Society of Modern China, at the University of Cologne, Germany.

Cologne China Studies Online – Working Papers on Chinese Politics, Economy and Society - is a publication series of Modern China Studies, Chair for Politics, Economy and Society of Modern China, at the University of Cologne, Germany. The series presents recent working papers and past analyses of continuing relevance in German or English language. All studies are numbered by year of completion and can be downloaded from the Internet address www.china.uni-koeln.de/papers. If not stated otherwise, the copyright stays with the authors.
Thomas Scharping

Minorities, Majorities and National Expansion:
The History and Politics of Population Development in Manchuria 1610-1993

On November 2, 1981 the Chinese news agency Xinhua reported that 80 scholars met in Shuangcheng county, Heilongjiang province, in order to participate in a Manchu language course. It was high time for such an activity in one of the few remaining pocket areas of spoken Manchu since only an estimated nine elderly people in the whole of China still displayed a good command of the language.\(^1\) Disregarding the larger number of people with a passive understanding of Manchu fragments, the academic enthusiasts who keep studying Manchu writings and the Xibe tribe of western Xinjiang region which speaks what some term a Manchu dialect\(^2\), this means that for all purposes Manchu language proper has become extinct by now. After more than 350 years of a proud history the end of the road seemed to have been reached.

Nine years after this report the Fourth National Population Census of the People’s Republic of China revealed a phenomenal increase of the Manchu population. Between 1982 and 1990 it more than doubled to nearly 10 million, turning the battered Manchu community into the third biggest nationality of China, right after the Han majority and the populous Zhuang of Guangxi region in the South of the country.\(^3\)

These conflicting signals give reason to reflect once more on population development in Northeast China. It is a subject closely interwoven with the political history of the region that in the first half of the 20th century was termed a cradle of conflicts.\(^4\) At that time the population problem of Manchuria seen with Chinese eyes was above all perceived as a national project of populating the vulnerable Chinese frontier in the Northeast with Chinese settlers. In this endeavor Chinese aspirations clashed violently with Russian and Japanese imperialism and their political ambitions to colonize Manchuria for their own purposes. Manchuria was regarded as a huge tract of pioneer country, and some Western authors did not hesitate to compare the contest for its colonization with the settlement of North-America, Australia, Argentina and Rhodesia.\(^5\)

After the defeat of Japan in 1945 and the withdrawal of the last Russian naval units from their base in Port Arthur in 1954 the Manchurian question dropped from the limelight of international interest. But China pursued her aim of full-scale integration of Manchuria with all the vigor of the newly victorious revolution. The reclamation of land and the build-up of cities, mines and industries, oil-fields and lumber-districts accelerated. New forms of organized nation-building along socialist lines dominated all the reports on the construction of the Northeast. But with the distance of a generation we also see the age-old plight of the Chinese peasant and an unabated poverty migration continuing underneath the fanfares of the mass campaigns.

At the turn of the century the question of settlement has become settled. There is no question that Manchuria has definitely become an integral part of China. But the 20th century with its history of racial conflicts and brute majority domination has become alerted to the fate of national minorities. Treatment of minorities has evolved into a yardstick for judging the quality of life and the degree of liberty in a given society. China’s performance in this regard should be evaluated, too. Admittedly, it is a different perspective than the Chinese point of view which is dominated by the experience of population pressure, overcrowding and the need for making use of the one most important remaining area for large-scale land reclamation. It is also different from the historical experience of China, a country repeatedly conquered by unruly nomadic tribes from the North who at long last were subdued by the powers of a dominant sedentary civilization in the South.

---

\(^1\) Xinhua, Nov 2, 1981.
\(^2\) Li Shulan 1979; Li Shulan et al. 1986.
\(^3\) Comp. table 2.
\(^4\) Lattimore 1935b.
\(^5\) Young 1929, 428.
During the whole of the 20th century Manchuria was the prime area for Chinese settlement, a Wild West of China which happened to be located in her Northeast. In the course of its conquest the problems of the Wild West surfaced, too: a border society experiencing economic boom coupled with cultural dislocation, majority ascendency marred by minority decline and degeneration. The brigands, convicts and ginseng poachers, the trappers, prostitutes and land-hungry migrants, the traders, gold-miners and raiding Mongols of Manchuria in times gone past look like a strange cast from an all too familiar piece of drama. There have been brave attempts to stem the tide. But the Manchu emperors, Japanese agents and Party students of primeval communism who for various reasons tried to preserve vestiges of a native way of life have all ultimately failed. In most cases, cultural assimilation or perishment has been the stark alternative for the natives, even if this has been veiled and cushioned by a layer of autonomy arrangements in recent times. From this point of view, the differences between a sinicized Manchu engineer and a native American or Siberian technician seem to be small, indeed - just as small as the difference between an alcoholized Tungus tribesman and an uprooted native under drug influence in other parts of the world.

The following article tries to sketch the process of integrating Manchuria into the Chinese body politic and the population development that played a role in this regard. It is both reworking well-known historical materials and applying demographic analysis to recent data from China. The article views the Three Northeastern Provinces of China and the Northeastern leagues of Inner Mongolia as a whole. Their identity of fate is evinced by the extension of Mongol rule to western Manchuria in the 15th century, the blending of Mongol and Manchu tribal organization under the banner system in the 17th century, the history of Chinese border settlement since the Ming period and the political fortunes of the Northeast in recent times. Economics and communication factors have contributed to this situation: the branch lines driven into Northeast Mongolia from the big Manchurian railway hubs have served as powerful arteries for pumping Chinese life into the region. They have guided the migration streams of the 20th century and they link that region inexorably to the giant industrial complexes on the Shenyang-Changchun-Harbin line. It is in recognition of these facts that even the People’s Republic of China has vacillated between inclusion or exclusion of the adjacent areas of Inner Mongolia into the provinces of the Northeast.

The attempt to paint a historically coherent picture of population development is not honored by the data available today. Regularly, numbers are organized on the lines of present-day political structures which separate the Northeast from Inner Mongolia. In contrast, data presented here try to include the three present provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang plus the Northeastern leagues of Inner Mongolia (Jo-uda, Jerim, Xing'an and Hulunbuir) whenever this is possible. The complexities of data arrangement are further complicated by the well-known problems of historical demography in China and the various administrative changes of the past. Shifts in territorial organization did not only guide the procedures for collecting and organizing population figures. Above all, they reflected the political forces at work: the failing attempts for Manchu segregation, the growing Chinese penetration, the Russian and Japanese intervention, the tug-and-toe with Mongolian nationalism. They therefore will be discussed in the following before proceeding to an analysis of historical population numbers. In the discussion historical place names will be given in their original form followed by their modern equivalents. Tables quoted refer to the annex of this paper. The extended bibliography of works used for the study contains many material suitable for further research on political, social and economic changes in Manchuria since the late Qing period.

The History and Politics of Territorial Integration 1644-1993

After the conquest of China in 1644, early Qing administration of Manchuria rested on the foundations of a post-conquest garrison command in Shengjing (Mukden or Shenyang). Soon it saw a division between the populous South with its strong Chinese influences and the vast areas of the North roamed by Mongol and Tungus tribes. In the South, in the prefecture of Fengtian established in 1657, there existed a complicated structure of both military and civilian government. This was an expression of the fact that the area always had a mixed population of Manchu and Han stock, and attempts at closing it to further Chinese settlement never really succeeded. The North, however, was largely devoid of Chinese influences, and the closure of Manchuria was enforced much tighter there. It came under a purely military government which was set up in the garrison town of Ningguta (Ning’an). Ningguta, as the territory was called for short, covered the eastern part of present Jilin province and the whole of modern

---

6 For a good outline of the natural setting and the various subregions of Manchuria see: Lattimore 1988, 103-149.
Heilongjiang. While it did not include the Mongol territories west of present Changchun it covered the thinly populated Barga grassland which since 1947 has become known as the Hulunbuir League of Inner Mongolia.

Prior to the encroachments of Russian imperialism and until the Sino-Russian treaties of 1858/60, Qing territory also extended all the way up to the Stanovoi Mountains (Outer Khingan) in the North and to the Sea of Japan in the West, encompassing parts of present Siberia and the later Maritime Province of the Russian Far East. When the military government moved from Ningguta to Kirin (Jilin), that city bequeathed its name to the territory governed from there. In 1683 a separate military government of Heilongjiang was carved out of Kirin. Its seat of government moved first from Aigun (Aihui) to Mergen (Nenjiang) and later to Qiqihar. In contrast to present Heilongjiang province it did not include the right bank of the Sungari river and the areas east to the Ussuri which kept being administrated from Kirin.

Just as in the case of Kirin, Fengtian prefecture in the South of Manchuria did not include the areas of Mongol settlement in the west and was much reduced in comparison to Liaoning province, its present-day successor. The uphill Mongol territory of the Chosotu League stretched right to a thin seaside corridor which connected Fengtian with Shanhaiguan, the entry to China proper and the last fortified pass of the Great Wall before it reached the sea.

The Mongol banners which in Northeastern Mongolia were subordinate to the three leagues of Jo-uda (present-day Chifeng municipal region of Inner Mongolia), Jerim (still existing as part of Inner Mongolia) and Chosotu (Chaoyang municipal region of Liaoning province) were established by the Manchu emperors starting in 1637. They served the dual purpose of breaking up old tribal allegiances by replacing them with a feudal nobility dependent on imperial support and of tying unruly nomads to a circumscribed territory that could be controlled. Governed autonomously by Mongol princes, banners and leagues came under the control of the Court of Tribal Affairs (Lifan Yuan) founded in 1638 and elevated to ministerial rank in 1661. Banners and their nuclei, the companies or Niru of about 300 fighting men with their dependents, were also the basic units for drafting soldiers, organizing Manchu peasant communities and keeping the register for the Manchu population. As such they led a separate existence from the county administration (xian) along Chinese lines which was set up for the ever increasing numbers of civilian Han settlers. While xian in Fengtian were present right from the early 1650s, they typically made their appearance in the North at a much later date: 1727 in Kirin, 1875 in Heilongjiang.7

Special rules of government applied to the hunting tribes of Heilongjiang (Buteha), which were partly integrated into the Manchurian banner organization, partly governed by a separate administration within the military government. Keeping their own headmen, they were required to render periodic fur tributes and to contribute fighting men for the Manchu military forces. A further exception was made for the imperial hunting grounds in Rehe (Chengde) and the surrounding Mongol country which was put under a separate administration partly functioning parallel to the usual banner system. In order to emphasize the close attachment of this imperial reserve to the court in Beijing and to recognize the increasing number of Chinese settlers there, Rehe together with large tracts of the Jo-uda and Chosotu Leagues was subordinated to the capital province of Zhili (Hebei) in 1778.8

With the exception of minor changes these administrative arrangements endured until the late 19th century. Then, under the impact of the growing danger of loosing the Northeast to Russian and Japanese designs, a rapid change of the administrative structures set in: in 1876 Fengtian was awarded a civilian government on the model of the Chinese heartland; in 1882 the separate Buteha administration for the hunting tribes was abolished; in 1907 the former military administration of Fengtian, Kirin and Heilongjiang ceased. At the same time large Mongol areas adjacent to these Three Northeastern Provinces were put under their authority. It all served to facilitate Chinese settlement of Manchuria - a development much dreaded by the court in former times and now left as its only device against the threat from outside. Accordingly, Chinese county seats multiplied in Manchuria and a further province was created: Rehe, the erstwhile purely Mongolian territory northeast of Beijing, fully absorbed the Jo-uda and Chosotu Leagues. After the overthrow of the monarchy it became a provisional province under the new republican government in 1914, evolving into a full-fledged province in 1928 when the Guomindang took over and extended Chinese administration to many other minority territories accorded special treatment until that time. Chinese nationalism, by now

8 Qiu Pu 1978, 102-106; Dawoer-zw jianshi 1986, 48; China Yearbook 1914/15, 616.
thoroughly aroused and fixed on the dangers of foreign aggression, denied all national aspirations to the Mongols of Manchuria, who in 1930 pleaded in vain for an autonomous government for the whole of Inner Mongolia. In 1920 it already had effectively canceled the independence moves of Barga Mongols who had driven out Chinese settlers in 1912 and opted for a union of all Mongol tribes. It also hastened the nearly completed assimilation of Manuchs, who as members of a hated and formerly privileged alien group took care to blend into Chinese society. This assimilation had already started right with the Manchu conquest of China. At the zenith of Qing power during the Qianlong period (1736-1795) it had become an irreversible trend with only Heilongjiang still holding fast to Manchu ways.

What Chinese nationalism failed to accomplish was the restoration of rights ceded to Russia in 1896-98 and to Japan in 1905. The former had acquired the privilege to build and administer the so-called Chinese Eastern Railway, a huge project providing a short cut between Irkutsk and Vladivostok and linking up to the new Russian naval base of Port Arthur in the leased territory of Guandong peninsula in South Manchuria. This proved to be the gateway to a sphere of influence which after the occupation of Manchuria by the Russian army in 1900-1905 grew to include the whole of the Northeast.

After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05 Manchuria was divided into a Russian sphere of influence in the North and a Japanese sphere in the South. Japan took over the Guandong leasehold with Port Arthur. It administered the South Manchurian Railway Zone which extended from Port Arthur and the neighboring civilian port of Dairen up to the North of Changchun. It later bolstered the regime of Zhang Zuolin, the independent-minded Chinese warlord of Manchuria from 1911 to 1928. And it founded the South Manchurian Railway Company which besides its transport activities also excelled in the roles of a powerful economic empire, a medical and educational enterprise, a research agency on Chinese affairs and a vanguard for the Japanese occupation of all Manchuria.

When this occupation finally occurred with the seizure of the Three Northeastern Provinces in 1932 and of Rehe in 1933, the provincial boundaries of the newly created state of Manchukuo were redrawn. A host of small provincial units appeared, which broke up the old pattern of the late Qing and early republican period. The new state with the reinstated Manchu emperor Pu Yi as its formal head would have liked to present more than just symbols and court protocol to underline its distinctiveness from China. However, the integration of Manchu population into Chinese society had already progressed to such a degree that no Manchu entity could be set up to give credence to the name and the special character of the state.

This was different from the Mongol case. Here an important administrative initiative during 1932/33 was the creation of the four sub-provinces of East, South, North and West Xing’an which consisted of the traditional Mongol banner lands. In 1943 they were combined into a single Xing’an province. This set-up was a concession to Mongol nationalism, which ever since the 1910s was courted by Japanese policy-makers in their plans for the domination of China. For the first time Mongol demands for self-government, cultural autonomy and a respite from Chinese land reclamation in the steppe were met. The difference to the Chinese policy of absorption adopted since 1907 could not have been greater. Nevertheless, Japanese policy which increasingly centered on military requirements, prevented pan-Mongolian aspirations and stressed the supremacy of Japanese culture later led to much minority disappointment. And the manpower requirements for the economic construction of Manchukuo overrode the attempts to shut off the Japanese puppet state. Chinese labor migration into the Northeast continued and with it the ethnic restructuring of the region.

After the Japanese defeat in World War II Manchuria reverted to Chinese sovereignty. In the renewed confrontation between communist and Guomindang forces the communist side had the good sense to establish Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in 1947. This was a plea for Mongol support in the civil war and at least a tacit vindication of Japanese policy in the past. After a number of territorial adjustments a territorial entity was created that took the

---

11 Jansen 1975; McCormac 1977.
Manchukuo Xing’an province as its basis and for the first time accommodated the vast majority of Chinese Mongols under a common roof. In the Northeast the autonomous region covered almost all traditional Mongol territories. Special treatment was also accorded to the Koreans and the smaller Tungus populations of Manchuria, which were recognized as national minorities and granted limited self-government in autonomous counties established between 1952 and 1958.

The communist nationality policy was a departure from Guomindang practice which had partitioned Inner Mongolia, nibbled away from Mongol rights and denied the notion of separate nationalities within the Chinese race. However, the glaring exception to the new communist pattern of rule was once again the Manchu nation. Although it, too, was recognized as a national minority, there were no special statutes for autonomous Manchu areas. Whether this reflected the ongoing process of assimilation or lingering resentment against the rulers of yesterday can only be an object of speculation.

In the greater part of Manchuria outside of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region the various provinces of the Manchukuo and Guomindang period were abolished in 1949. Instead, the old administrative arrangement of the three provinces Fengtian, now rechristened Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang was revived, with a number of areas being exchanged among them. When in 1955 Hebei province was split up between Hebei (Chengde district), Liaoing (Chaoyang district) and Inner Mongolia (Jo-uda league), Chinese administration was almost back to the state of affairs in the late 19th century. It took the Cultural Revolution to demonstrate again the enduring conflict between minority rights and the overwhelming reality of Chinese economic domination. In the decade from 1969 to 1979 the Northeastern leagues of Inner Mongolia were handed over to Liaoning (Jo-uda league), Jilin (Jerim league) and Heilongjiang (Hulunbuir league), respectively. Just as in the republican period precedent was given to arrangements that facilitated the economic penetration of Manchuria, the total integration of the territory and a new wave of Chinese settlement. And little was heard of remaining autonomous rights in the other Northeastern minority areas either. In a climate of campaigns against “bourgeois nationalism”, “feudal remnants” and “backward customs” the nationality question was perceived as a question of class and subordinated to revolutionary struggle.

The policy of reform adopted at the end of 1978 has corrected this situation. The reinstatement of minority rights has been one of the major initiatives in the social and political sphere. Among the benefits have been overrepresentation for minority cadres, quotas for minority students at schools of higher learning, preferential treatment in the allocation of industrial jobs, state support for an increased number of schools and hospitals, acceptance of re-registration of the nationality status of individuals, more cultural autonomy in matters of language, religious creed and national customs. All of these measures are also intended to alleviate the gap in educational attainment and the standard of living between the Han majority and most of the minorities. While under normal conditions many preferences are hard to enforce, they carry more clout with them once autonomous areas are established. The number of autonomous counties has grown accordingly. This time they included autonomous townships, too - a measure designed to meet the reality of ethnic mixture, small minority communities and highly dispersed settlements. Of course, real political autonomy is out of question as Party and military positions are not subject to quota handling, and finances are dependent on government subsidies. Finally, there are the State Nationalities Commission in Beijing and the United Front Department of the Party’s Central Committee controlling it. With their nomenclatura, the power to join provincial organs in appointing or dismissing all important personnel in minority areas, they play a similar role as the Court of Tribal Affairs of the Qing and early republican period or its successor, the Commission for Mongolia and Tibet (Meng-zang weiyuanhui) of the Guomindang.

Nevertheless, the circumscribed autonomy has carried tangible results. For Manchuria the new policy not only brought a return to the provincial boundaries before the Cultural Revolution. The Northeastern Mongol leagues were restored to Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, taking the Oroqon autonomous county on the northernmost tip of Chinese territory, one of the last refuges of a traditional Tungus way of life that had been sacrificed to the lumbering interests of Heilongjiang province, along with them. A major beneficiary of the various measures alluded to has been the Manchu nation that for the first time was granted autonomous areas, too. This started in 1984 with the

---

13 Clubb 1954.
14 ZSM, passim and annex.
15 Lu Minghui 1980.
16 Neimenggu zizhiqu jingji dili 1956; Minzu tushuguan 1984, passim.
establishment of autonomous Manchu townships in Xiuyan and Fengcheng counties of Southeast Liaoning and culminated 1985 in the symbolic gesture of creating the first Manchu autonomous county at Xinbin in eastern Liaoning, the site of Nurhaci’s first Manchu capital of Hetu Ala. As of the end of 1993 the record for the whole Northeast showed 9 autonomous Manchu counties (8 in Liaoning, 1 in Jilin), 4 autonomous Mongol counties (2 in Liaoning and 1 in Jilin and Heilongjiang each), 1 autonomous Korean district and 1 autonomous Korean county (both in Jilin). Within the Hulunbuir League of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region there exists 1 autonomous county for the Dagur, Evenki and Oroqon nationalities each. These numbers do not include the more numerous autonomous townships for which no such balance is available.18

Perhaps even more influential for minority population development has been the one-child policy started in 1979. Its effects will be discussed later on. But here it must be stressed that it has tremendously enlarged the structure of incentives favoring minorities. While they were first dispensed from any birth planning altogether, minorities later at least retained the right to a second or even a third child. This policy is a reaction to the low population density in some minority territories and an answer to minority fears of being drowned in the waves of Chinese settlement. In Inner Mongolia it has been translated into complete birth control exemptions for the small Tungus tribes of Hulunbuir League. Mongols with urban registration in Inner Mongolia are given the right to two children, in rural areas this is extended to a third child. In the three Northeastern provinces the birth control regulations are stricter. Tungus tribesmen in neighboring Heilongjiang, including those in mixed marriages, are allowed three children. Other more populous minorities like Manchus, Mongols, Xibe and Hui (Chinese Muslim) are conceded a second child only for endogamous marriages. In heavily populated Liaoning this privilege was modified to include only endogamous couples having held minority status before 1985 and proving peasant status for the wife. Jilin first granted it to all urban and rural minority nationals in endogamous unions, restricting it in 1990 to small minorities with a population of less than 10 million.19

Problems of Population Count and Ethnicity in Manchuria

Qing population numbers from Manchuria suffer from the same problems as data on the historical demography for the rest of China.20 The most important ones are well-known and can be briefly summarized as follows: Until the reform of registration under the Qianlong emperor in the 18th century household numbers or ding-totals for the number of taxable adult males replace total population numbers; attempts to use them as the basis for reckoning a total suffer from fluctuations in household-sizes and conversion rates. Non-taxable population such as prisoners, monks or nobility with tax privileges are not covered. There is a general undercount of women and a serious omission of children under six years of age. Precise information on counting procedures is all too often lacking and many figures seem to be just copies or mechanical additions to former numbers. Copying mistakes abound. Many totals show sudden dramatic increases or equally unexplained periods of stagnation. There is no way to differentiate de-jure from de-facto population, and no uniform time standard is applied. Historical population numbers from China are sweet to the scholar used to the demographic black-out in other regions of the world, but they turn sour once they are scrutinized carefully.

The problems of the traditional population count continued right to the end of the Qing period, when the republican revolution of 1911 prevented the completion of a census begun in 1909. Due to the incessant wars and the lack of administrative clout the situation hardly improved during republican times. The attempted census of 1928/29 ended in failure. Incomplete registration numbers until 1948 seem to be generally understated and do not fit with later census results of the People’s Republic.

For a study of regional population development in general and of Manchuria in particular the problems multiply: The administrative records of the Qing period continue with ding-numbers from the encyclopedic Qing Comprehensive History of Civilization (Qing wenxian tongkao) for various years between 1661 and 1767. Provincial

18 Liaoning ribao, Apr 21, 1984; Xinhua, June 7, 1985; ZMT, 6; ZXQJ.
population totals start with the highly problematic figures from the *Collected Statutes of the Qianlong Period (Qianlong huidian)* in 1753, as a time series they are only available for the period 1786-1898 with growing deficiencies after the Taiping uprising. 21 Illegal in-migration during the Qing period and seasonal out-migration during republican times plague all attempts to come up with reliable totals. For in-depth studies a separate register for banner population must be combined with civilian records. Within the banner organization conflicting information on Niru manpower has to be cross-checked with conflicting information on Niru numbers. And many a source is evasive once it comes to differentiating between the number of warriors drafted for garrison or campaign duty and the total adult males in the Niru. This renders it extremely difficult to take information on Manchu banner organization as a basis for calculating Manchu population numbers. 22 While the study of the newly accessible banner registers may still yield further information in the future 23, population records covering banner estate lands seem to be irrevocably lost.

The documentary basis for the study of smaller minorities is much more limited. Population numbers are either completely lacking or even more fragmentary than Chinese or Manchu population totals. They only improve in those cases where anthropological field research started around the turn of the century. 24

During the first half of the 20th century the frequent change of administrative areas makes territorial figures incomparable. The fragmentary attempts at census-taking in 1909-1910 and 1928-1929 have been interpreted quite differently. Typically, in Fengtian the count was carried out much better than in Kirin or Heilongjiang. The problems are such that even the reputed Japanese census-takers and the researchers of the South Manchurian Railway Company had to surrender and in some instances presented highly diverse population numbers. This also holds true for the 1940 Manchukuo census, which was a major achievement in terms of enumerating and structuring the total population but which is dubious as far as ethno-specific figures are concerned. 25 Serious studies of minority population developments have just started in recent years and are hampered by the inferior quality of historical materials. When the Academia Sinica in the 1950s undertook its nation-wide project of studying national minorities, the anthropologists were so obsessed with their political mandate to study property relations that in many respects they missed the probably last chance to research other aspects of minority behavior in self-contained native societies. Nor does the largely self-gratulatory documentary series on all autonomous areas of China published under the aegis of the State Nationalities Commission 1980 attempt any deeper probing of demographic trends. 26

Turning to secondary literature the situation is only slightly better. The Western standard work on the population history of China offers only a very short outline of the settlement of Manchuria without discussing questions of ethnic structure. 27 While Chinese historians of population development excel in painstaking archival and philosophical work, their effort all too often is limited to a mere collection of numbers without checking for definitional and demographic consistency. This produces a quagmire of contradictory population totals with abstruse household-sizes and sex ratios. Of all works published to date, only Zhao Wenlin’s and Xie Shujun’s *Population History of China* has made an effort to adjust the historical population totals from the provinces for later-day territorial changes and the most glaring inconsistencies. 28 But even the most ambitious project on regional demographic history so far, the encyclopedic series on *China’s Population* published in the late 1980s as a joint project of China’s most 21 Compare especially the monumental collection of historical population, land and tax numbers submitted in Liang Fangzhong 1980 and the earlier collection of provincial population numbers from the census registers of the Qing Board of Revenue published in Yan Zhongping et al. 1955, 362-374.
24 Fraser 1892; Arsenjew; Shirokogoroff 1926; Shirokogoroff 1934; Ling Chunsheng 1934; Lindgren 1935; Jettmar 1937.
26 Out of the huge number of volumes of the earlier project which were printed for public circulation after 1980 only, examples pertaining to the Northeast are: Elunchun-zu shehu i lishi diaocha 1984; Dawoer-zu shehui lishi diaocha 1985. As example for the series: Ewenke-zu zhidiqu gaikuang 1987.
27 Ho Ping-ti 1959, 158-163.
28 Zhao Wenlin and Xie Shujun 1988, 442-475, 500-511.

prestigious demographic institutes, does not hesitate to combine deficient historical data to produce the most unlikely rates of increase.\(^{29}\) On the ethno-demographic side, the encyclopedic *Series on the History of the National Minorities of China* offers good documentary research but in terms of demographic consistency the situation is hardly better.\(^{30}\)

While these are familiar problems of historical demography, one issue is particularly cumbersome in the Manchurian case: change of ethnic status. It is also a problem in other areas of China such as Hubei, Hunan and Guizhou where the process of sinification makes many minorities almost indistinguishable from the Han majority.\(^ {31}\) But in Manchuria the dimensions seem to be greater than there. Taking an average rate of natural increase of 2.5% per year as a rough yardstick for normal population growth, it can be calculated that in the whole of China 88% of the Manchu increase between 1978 and 1990 or a staggering more than 6.33 million was due to ethnic reclassification rather than the usual dynamics of births and deaths. In the case of the much smaller Xibe nationality which is closely related to the Manchus the percentage swells to 92%, equal to nearly 0.13 Mio. people.\(^ {32}\)

These are percentages reckoned from the national totals. By definition it includes Manchus and Xibe residing outside of Manchuria, too. But it offers the most telling insight, because reclassification after the Cultural Revolution began already in 1980/81 as a part of the preparatory work for the third population census of 1982. Rules finalized in a joint circular of the Census Leading Group, the Ministry of Public Security and the State Nationalities Commission during November 1981 governed this major step. For the offspring of mixed marriages they stipulated that in the case of children and youth under 18 years of age parents decided on the nationality status. Adults decided on their own. Orphans could also revert to the nationality of their grandparents. As there was no age-limit to other people desiring a change of nationality status because of past discrimination and since all wrong registrations irrespective of time were to be corrected, the rules effectively allowed reclassification for millions of people and opened the way to a complete reshaping of ethnic population structure.\(^ {33}\) In the case of the number of Manchus and Xibe residing in the northeast no precise figures for 1978 are available. But during the period 1982-1990, between the third and fourth population census, the percentages for population growth due to reclassification would still amount to an impressive 80% for the Manchus and 85% for the Xibe, indicating that this factor has continued to be a major driving force for recent minority development in Manchuria.\(^ {34}\)

While Manchu and Xibe offer the most striking examples of the effects of reclassification, Mongols and most other small Tungus nationalities all show the same tendency of grossly inflated population numbers during recent years. Mixed marriages and their offspring always seem to be the major social group involved. There are no representative figures for the behavior of couples hailing from different nationalities, but the few reports available all demonstrate that an overwhelming majority of them is desiring minority nationality status for their children.\(^ {35}\) It can be induced that half-caste adults show the same tendency. In all cases the major reason for their decision seems to be the incentive structure for minority nationals referred to above. In the large majority of cases change of nationality status would be an issue for people descended from mixed couples with one partner being Han-Chinese and the other belonging to a minority group. Patrilineal family systems and large numbers of single migrants from China proper bring about a preponderance of marriages between Han-Chinese males and non-Han females. While minority women often see such a union as an avenue to social advancement, male Han-Chinese appreciate the opportunity to save the sometimes abhorrent marriage expenses that come up in many rural areas of China.

But mixed marriages need not be confined to unions of Han-Chinese and minority nationals only. Dagur, Oroqon and Evenki have been living in close contact with their Mongol neighbors for centuries. In many cases they are polyglots who show a tendency to switch allegiances and to adopt Mongol nationality should this be suitable.

---

\(^{29}\) Comp. the volumes on the provinces of the northeast: Song Zexing 1987 for Liaoning, Song Naigong 1987 for Inner Mongolia, Cao Mingguo 1988 for Jilin, Xiong Yangwu 1989 for Heilongjiang.

\(^{30}\) The following works were checked: Man-zu jianshi 1979; Elunchun-zu jianshi 1983; Menggu-zu jianshi 1985; Dawoer-zu jianshi 1986; Xibo-zu jianshi 1986.

\(^{31}\) Zhang Tianlu 1982; Zhang Tianlu 1989, 70-86.

\(^{32}\) Calculated from data in table 2.

\(^{33}\) Interviews with the State Council Population Census Office and the research division of the Central Nationalities College in Beijing in September 1986. The directive is available in Minzu gongzuo shouce 1985, pp. 450-452.

\(^{34}\) Calculated from data in table 5.

\(^{35}\) Yang Yixing, Zhang Tianlu and Xiong Yu 1988, 35-36.
Interracizations between Mongol, Dagur, Oroqon and Evenki nationals are frequent and also blur the statistics. Birth control regulations favoring the small nationalities can be safely assumed to be the main reason for the present trend to a revitalization of former small nationality status. Including the numerous reversions from Han to Mongol nationality, in the whole of Inner Mongolia more than 0.45 Mio. people or 2.3 % of the population are reckoned to have changed their nationality between 1978 and 1982 - a fraction of total population but a 15% share of its minority component.36  

Change of nationality status has been a prominent issue during the last decade. But it is not a new phenomenon. As a matter of fact, large-scale reclassification already occurred during the 1950s when minorities were officially recognized as separate entities for the first time. During that period many a Chinese discovered non-Han blood in his veins and reflected on the benefits of minority status. For the second population census of 1964 a tendency to understate minority numbers can be assumed, since campaigns against “local nationalism” had already started. Nor is this waxing and waning of minority population numbers confined to the period of the People’s Republic. A highly developed ability of adoption to adverse circumstances has always characterized social behavior in China. It is this ability that has enabled many Manchus and other minority nationals of the Northeast to pose as Chinese during the republican period - a period which did not appreciate rival identities perceived as hindering the process of nation-building in China and which fostered much discrimination against aboriginals. And it is this same capacity for adaptive behavior that provided a not insignificant number of Chinese with the means to become “manchurized” three centuries before. While sinification has been the dominant theme in the relations between China and her neighbors, this reverse process has always been present, too - admittedly, as an undercurrent on a much smaller scale.

Finally, there is the age-old phenomenon of tribal confederations on China’s Northem border showing a tendency to break up and recombine, integrating diverse ethnic elements and generating new nations in the process. The Mongols themselves are the product of such a melting of proto-Mongol, Turkish and Tungus elements during the 12th and 13th centuries. When in 1616 the forerunner of the Qing dynasty, the Later Jin dynasty, was proclaimed, and in 1635 the newly coined name “Manchu” replaced the former designation “Jurchen” for the half agrarian, half nomadic tribes of the Northeast, this history was repeated and a new nation, predominantly of Tungus stock but also containing Mongol, Chinese and perhaps even some Korean elements, emerged.37  

The Native Population

A look at table 4 brings out the perhaps astonishing fact that Chinese have always counted among the natives of Manchuria, at least in the period under discussion here. In the late Ming period more than 3 million Chinese are supposed to have settled in Liaodong region, roughly the present province of Liaoing. This number was soon to seriously diminish due to the constant border wars. It certainly does not come from a reliable count in the modern sense. But all sources agree that the Chinese of Liaodong were by far the biggest component of the Northeastern ethnic mix, amounting to about 70% of the total population or even more.38 Their great numbers made the gathering of strength one of the foremost tasks of the emerging Manchu power.

Population problems have shaped the history of the Manchu nation from the very start as a serious lack of manpower impeded the political and economic ambitions of Nurhaci, the Manchu founding father. In his numerous campaigns against the related Jurchen tribes of the Northeast the capture of bondservants for work on the home estates and the seizure of fighting men to strengthen military forces seem to have figured more prominently than the acquisition of new territory. Tribes that surrendered voluntarily where exempted from taxation and integrated into the emerging nation as Old Manchu. Those conquered after the consolidation of the early Manchu state were enlisted into the banner forces as New Manchu without the former group’s privileges. The continuous raids on Chinese territories during the late Ming period drove many Chinese to escape from the frontier, depopulating the old Ming territory of Liaodong. By way of revenge, the Manchus captured hundreds of thousands of Chinese in North

---

36 Song Naigong 1987, 342-348.  
37 Linke 1982, 6.  
38 Man-zu jianshi 1979, 13; Zhang Boquan, Su Jinyuan and Dong Yuying 1981, 256.
China and resettled them on the idle lands. The incessant wars continued in the 1630s and 1640s with campaigns in the regions North of the Manchu heartland from which some 40,000 prisoners of war or capitulants were driven to the South and incorporated into the Manchu banners, too. 39

Banners were the great organizational invention of Manchu statecraft. Their nuclei, the niru or companies of 300 men, served as mobile fighting units or settlements of military colonists. The basic structure of the famous Eight Banners was already completed in 1615. While at that early date they were restricted to Manchus in the narrow sense of the word, they later were enlarged to enlist both allied Mongol forces and Chinese capitulants. This is not the place to dwell on the intricacies of banner organization. But it must be stressed that even before the conquest of China “Manchu” had become an ambivalent term. It could mean the Old Manchu (Fe Manju) rallying to Nurhaci and his successor Abahai (Hong Taiji) in the early phase of the tribe’s rise to power. It could include the New Manchu (Ice Manju), the related Tungus tribes that were integrated after defeat. By popular usage it could also refer to all bannermen and their dependents, including the large number of Mongols and Chinese who joined the Manchu cause shortly before but particularly after the conquest of China in 1644. 40

This blurred definition of the Manchu nation has been always bewildering and led to highly diverse estimates of its numbers. The situation became even more complicated, when in 1742 emperor Qianlong permitted Chinese bannermen to leave the banners and revert to civilian Han status. There are no statistics available on the number of Chinese taking advantage of this economically motivated offer. But we are informed that those Chinese bannermen who became manchurized before 1644 were exempted from the gesture. 41 Apparently, they were not felt to be Chinese any more. In later periods Chinese bannermen seem to have switched their self-designation according to political circumstances. During the Qing period, when Manchus were rewarded with political, social and economic privileges, a great number of them seem to have blended with the conquerors. After the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty most Manchus hid their national origins, a defensive reaction that was obviously easier for Chinese bannermen to adopt. On the Northern Heilongjiang border small, isolated settlements of unassimilated Manchus, such as the one studied by Shirokogoroff in 1915, survived for some years. But the pressures against them only receded when privileges to minority nationalities were accorded during the early 1950s and after 1980. In these periods, many Chinese bannermen seem to have claimed Manchu nationality once again. Field studies conducted in the Manchu heartland of Eastern Liaoing province in 1980 showed that besides such change of allegiances other forces were at work, too. In spite of an almost total sinification as far as language, dress and social conventions were concerned, most Manchus living in Xiuyan county still kept a strong feeling of national identity and ancestral tradition. More than 70% of marriages were endogamous unions within the Manchu nationality. And under the policy of national reclassification referred to above, many peasant clans carrying such innocuous Chinese names as Zhang or Huang completely declared themselves to be Manchu again. 42

What then have been the demographic effects of such diverse developments over the centuries? The still existing records from Nurhaci’s times document the existence of some 80 niru in 1601, expanding to 199 in 1614. On the basis of 300 men per niru this information can be used to reckon with roughly 60,000 male adults and an estimated total 0.2 - 0.3 million Manchus for the latter date. In later times, niru seem to have had a tendency to shrink in size. We are told of 200 men per niru in 1634 and 150 in 1700. Also, the strength of Manchu niru, Mongol niru (the first ones established in 1626) and Chinese niru (the first ones formed around 1630) seems to have changed. As the estimates of dependents and adult males not in military service vary, too, the range given for the pre-conquest Manchu population reaches from 0.45 million to 0.60 million in 1640. These numbers would include approximately 20% Mongol bannermen with their dependents, 25% Chinese bannermen with dependents and an unknown share of bondservants. Again, these are rough calculations based on niru numbers that give general dimensions only. 43

The conquest of China in 1644 seems to have depopulated the Northeast. Nearly 180,000 soldiers from the Manchu, Mongol and Chinese banners are said to have “followed the dragon and entered the passes”. Some further 900,000

39 Man-zu jianshi 1979, 14-52; Linke 1982, 14-64; Song Zexing 1987, 34-35; Xiong Yangwu 1989, 48.
40 Precise definitions of Fe Manju and Ice Manju seem to vary: Xibo-zu jianshi 1986, 15; Man-zu jianshi 1979, 35.
See also Linke 1982, 82-82; Peng Bo 1985, 33-34; Lee 1970, 35.
41 Ibid.
nobles, officials and bannermen are supposed to have migrated to China in the wake of this epochal event.\textsuperscript{44} Manchuria dropped from the center of attention, and we have only the isolated information that more than 11,000 banner soldiers served in the Northeastern garrisons in 1686, growing to over 37,000 in 1735.\textsuperscript{45} From these figures and rough estimates of the number of Manchus migrated to China proper the total staying in Manchuria around 1660 is judged to amount to some 130,000 only.

Again on the basis of niru calculations, Manchu population in the whole of China is claimed to have expanded to an impressive 3.30 million around 1700 and 5.28 million in 1780.\textsuperscript{46} Such a large number would require an average natural increase over 1.5\% per year between 1660 and 1780 - a rather improbable rate for a population living under conditions of high mortality in a period prior to demographic transition. The large number therefore could only be justified by including non-Manchu bannermen and assuming a still increasing degree of manchurization.

Numbers of Manchu population in Manchuria must have been definitely smaller. Using the sources quoted in table 4 and the fragmented information on banner soldiers in the Northeastern garrisons, we estimate that their number expanded to about 0.5 million in 1790 and more than 1.5 million 100 years later. This would also be the upper limit of data given in the quite contradictory local gazetteers for the end of the 19th century.\textsuperscript{47} It would signify a slowing down of average annual growth rates from 1.5\% to 1.1 \%. Such an abating of growth rates would be in line with the general trend of population developments in China during the 19th century. But it would still far surpass the annual average of 0.63\% during 1779-1850 which Ho Ping-ti argues to be the most reliable guess we can make on growth rates for China’s total population during the Qing period.\textsuperscript{48} The puzzle of population dynamics during the 19th century is far from being solved with arguments presented for growth rates both on the low and on the high side.\textsuperscript{49} Accepting the figures for Manchu population quoted above would put them into the higher range.

The situation does not improve with the fragmentary “census” of 1909-1910. On the basis of the Chinese reports Rockhill in 1912 calculated a national total of banner population of roughly 1.5 million, adjusted for underreported children and missing garrison posts.\textsuperscript{50} Wang Shida reworked the figures in 1933 pointing out that Manchus and banner population contained in the civil registers of Fengtian, Kirin and Heilongjiang were not included. He came up with a banner population of 2.518 million in the whole of China including a 1.3 million population of banner members and hunting tribes in the Northeast.\textsuperscript{51} This was only half of the national total of around 5 million Manchus calculated for the end of the 18th century, still common in popular parlance and used by Sun Yatsen at the turn of the 20th century. It does not seem to be the last word, though. Recent research from China on the 1909/10 population check-up has presented a figure of 0.486 million Manchus in Liaoning plus 1.823 million Chinese bannermen and dependents residing in the province, equal to 4.8\% and 17.8\% of the Liaoning population total at that time.\textsuperscript{52} Once more these numbers alert us to the difference inclusion or exclusion of Chinese bannermen can make. But they do not square with the earlier studies. For Manchus in the narrow sense they are much lower than anticipated, for the banner population including the Chinese component they seem to be very high. An unexplained enigma remains.

The Manchu estimates of republican authors collected in table 1 (0.001 to 0.216 million) and the figure from the 1940 Manchukuo census (2.561 million) in table 5 all demonstrate the same uncanny variability of Manchu population numbers. And we do not feel better when we are offered an even greater selection to pick from: The

\textsuperscript{44} Song Zexing 1987, 35.
\textsuperscript{45} Man-zu jianshi 1979, 70.
\textsuperscript{46} Liu Qingxiang and Wang Yuanqing 1991.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.; Zhao Wenlin 1988, 443-445.
\textsuperscript{48} Ho Ping-ti 1959, 62-64.
\textsuperscript{49} Lee, Campbell and Tan Guofu 1992.
\textsuperscript{50} Rockhill 1912, 121. Comp. also Willcox 1940, 515. On the check-up procedures in the northeast see: Wang Shida 1932, 281-285.
\textsuperscript{51} Wang Shida 1933, 74, 99-100.
\textsuperscript{52} Liu Qingxiang and Wang Yuanqing 1991.
brother of the last Manchu emperor claimed that during the mid-thirties there were 0.08 million Manchus on register, while their real number reached 0.4-0.5 million.

Firmer ground is only reached with the advent of the People’s Republic which at last succeeded in holding the population censuses of 1953, 1964, 1982 and 1990. Further minority population numbers dated 1957 and 1978 hail from the registers. Together with the census results they are collected and analyzed in tables 2-3 which contain the Manchu totals for the whole of China and table 5 which presents the census results for the Northeast. The all-China totals demonstrate the continuing influence of political factors. Due to the improving living conditions the general trend of acceleration of most minority growth rates during 1953-1964 looks plausible. But it certainly also reflects the incentive minority policy of that period. The effects of the Cultural Revolution can be gauged from the conspicuous drop in growth during 1964-1978, which in the case of Manchus even led to an absolute decline. In contrast, the population figures of the reform period carry all the marks of compensational behavior heightened by response to the incentives of minority policy. Besides, a secular trend to lower mortality can be felt, too. Closer attention to the census results for the Northeast reveals a particularly high concentration of Manchus in their old home of Southeastern Liaoning, where they make up almost one third of the population. Other areas of high concentration are Eastern Jilin, central Liaoning, the region along the Shenyang-Shanhaiguan railway line and the old Heilongjiang garrison posts. This clearly mirrors the historical East-West migration and the military deployment of Manchus during the Qing period.

The Manchu age-pyramid reflects the effects of history, too. It shows totally unbalanced sex ratios for the age groups above 20 with a particularly high male preponderance for the cohorts born between 1890 and 1925. This is extremely unusual as we normally find a successively leveled sex ratio or even a majority of women in the upper age groups. Explanatory hypotheses would be a strong trend of out-marriage for women not affected by later reclassification as well as sex-specific infanticide known to have been practiced widely in rural Liaoning. The last two censuses both documented the Manchus as a nationality with a conspicuously large number of missing infant girls.

1990 census results for the educational level and professional status of Manchus in tables 7 and 8 also reveal the predominantly peasant character of Manchus in the Northeast. In white-collar positions and in the industrial sector they are generally underrepresented, their educational standard is lower than that of nearly all the other nationalities. Other materials also certify a noted prevalence of nutritional deficiency diseases, an unfavorable land-man-ratio and a very low social product for the Manchu heartland of Southeastern Liaoning. Clearly, these are not the rulers of China any more.

While the Manchu population still presents many riddles, the demographic development of the smaller Tungus minorities is easier to survey. It is characterized by an almost total lack of quantitative materials for the earlier periods and greater clearness for the contemporary era due to the small numbers involved. Particularly fragmentary is the information on the Xibe tribe, which offers a good example of ethnic blending. Apparently, one part of the tribe was manchurized during Abahai’s times in the early 17th century. It was incorporated into the banners and became indistinguishable from the closely related Manchus. Another part of the Xibe was ruled as bondservants by the Khorchin Mongol tribe. When this tribe surrendered to Manchu power, it presented the bondservants to the Manchu victors. By 1690 these Xibe had also become a part of the banner organization, many of them serving in the Beijing and Mukden (Shenyang) garrisons. In 1764 more than 3,000 Xibe were deployed to far-away Xinjiang in order to guard the Chinese frontier there. In the diaspora they kept a strong sense of identity. Xibe remaining in the Northeast, however, seem to be a case of many-faceted and nearly completed assimilation processes. Mongolization was replaced by manchurization, although, in contrast to many other assimilated tribes, Manchus held on to the Xibe designation which carried a derogatory note with it. In modern times Xibe of the Northeast have succumbed to the influences of sinification, losing their own language and script in the process. Just as in the case of Manchus, they have kept a low profile during the early 20th century, resurfacings with the gratuities of the reform period. Living

54 Ibid.; Sun Jingxin 1959, 63; Peng Bo 1985, 34; Song Zexing 1987, 286.
55 1990RP.
56 Zhang Tianlu 1989, 168; 1990RP.
58 Xibo-zu jianshi 1986; Wu Yuanfeng and Zhao Zhiqiang 1981.
mostly in the Liaoning districts of Shenyang and Tieling, they are more urbanized than the Manchus, other social and economic characteristics being similar to them. In Jilin and Heilongjiang, where Xibe numbers are much smaller, their advancement on the ladder of social success is remarkably higher. Would it not be for the benefits minority status, Xibe of the Northeast most probably would have vanished by now.

Slightly better is documentation for the closely related Evenki and Oroqon nations. Together with the Dagur they were formerly subsumed under the collective Manchu designation “Solon”. When the Manchus conquered the upper Amur region they repeatedly fought with the Evenki settling there. After the Russian advance into the Baikal-Amur-Region a substantial number of Evenki and Oroqon migrated to hunting grounds in the Greater Khingan Mountains of the present Heilongjiang province of China. Late in the 17th century Qing emperor Kangxi took Solon into the banner organization, his successor Yongzheng in 1731 set up the special Buteha-Administration for them. It comprised 47 Evenki nira, 39 Dagur nira and 6 Oroqon nira, indicating roughly the different strength of the hunting tribes. These tribes were highly regarded as warriors. In 1732 many of them were resettled to the present-day Hulunbuir area of Inner Mongolia for border protection against Russia.

Already in the 18th and 19th centuries Evenki numbers dwindled due to resettlement, war casualties, high mortality and assimilation to Mongols. From the 20,000 to 30,000 Evenki recorded in the republican era only more than 6,000 were left at the first Chinese census of 1953. Ever since, Evenki numbers have displayed roughly the same growth pattern as the other minorities of the Northeast. In difference to Manchus and Xibe, however, reclassification among them seems to have considerably slowed after 1982. Evenki show various degrees of assimilation. 61% of them living as herdsmen in the Hulunbuir grassland around Hailar have successfully adapted to Mongol ways, 6% living in Heilongjiang are partly sinicized peasants. As a telling indicator of progress, infant mortality in the regions inhabited by them has dropped from the 30% of 1939 to around 2% in 1976. These are also the groups that have experienced social progress as documented by the high percentages of white-collar professions in table 8. As these high percentages concentrate in the technical and administrative brackets with lower shares for trade and service personnel, and as they are not matched by a corresponding advancement of educational levels in table 7, they seem to be a clear case of preferential treatment in autonomous areas.

The price paid for all this is revealed in table 6 showing a dramatic decline of the Evenki share in the total population of Evenki Autonomous Banner set up by the Japanese in 1932. The decline in Evenki population share is caused by heavy Chinese in-migration which has raised the number of Han-settlers there from just 1,764 in 1958 to nearly 57,000 in 1982. Han-Chinese have ploughed the steppe, and they have built up many industries around Hailar and Manzhouli. Such activities have uprooted the traditional way of life. But the alternative of clinging to the past is just as unattractive. The 30% of Evenki who keep being part-time hunters and who at least partially resisted the change from nomadic to sedentary life brought about by Chinese settlement programs between 1954 and 1968 seem to have stagnated demographically. And the just 1% Evenki of the Left Argun Banner who keep to the traditional hunting ways have continuously declined. From the 435 living there at the end of the last century just 170 remained in 1982. Still roaming the woods and riding reindeer, practicing shamanism and equally sharing their booty in the early 1960s, they have been studied as practitioners of primeval communism. But this seems to be a way of life destined to die out.

Evenki fate is paralleled by the Oroqon story, which until the end of the 19th century is more or less a replica of it. But with the 20th century catastrophe came. The numbers of this hunting tribe roaming the Greater Khingan Mountains seemingly had already declined for some time. When Shirokogoroff visited the region between 1915-17 he recorded only slightly over 4,000 Oroqon, a far cry from the more than 10,000 who figure in the Chinese
registers between 1880 and 1895. This decline could have been caused by the extremely high infant mortality rate - a frightening 80% is assumed to have been occurring, and until 1952 about 65% of all deaths are supposed to have been children. But other factors played a role, too. Between 1905 and 1938 three waves of epidemic diseases took a toll of an estimated 25-35% of the Oroqon population. During 1915-27 the first attempts to sedentarize the hunters and to make them turn to agriculture failed.

Both developments seem to have been not entirely disconnected: Many sources hint at the devastating impact of the beginning Chinese settlement in the region, which became known for its gold-mining potential. Alcohol and opium were introduced to be eagerly taken up by hunters fighting against loneliness and extremely low temperatures. Tuberculosis and other diseases spread, meeting no resistance in a population unaccustomed to them. Chinese traders imported the concept of indebtedness unknown before. Some of them were killed in 1922-24 during Oroqon riots which forced the government to cancel all debts.

It was the Japanese who from 1939 to 1945 brought a certain respite from the constant pressure. The Oroqon region of settlement was declared off-limits, all attempts at sedentarization ceased and a policy of ethnic separation was enforced. Opium, however, continued to be supplied to the addicts. These services were paid for by the monopoly of a Japanese company trading in furs and by the formation of an Oroqon mountain brigade policing the area against communist guerillas.

The guerillas supported by Soviet troops won. And with them the greatest of all leaps forward, that from primeval communism directly into a socialist society, was undertaken. In 1951 the Oroqon were awarded one of the very first autonomous counties in China. One year later Chinese medical teams were sent to care for them, and schooling for the totally illiterate group began. Financial subsidies arrived, and a number of Oroqon delegations toured the big cities of China to watch out for the models to emulate. Between 1953 and 1958 sedentarization was tried again, settlements with brick houses were built and hunters were persuaded to become peasants. It did not serve them well. For after settlement two campaigns for the “construction” of the virgin forests in the Great Khingan Mountains set in. During 1958-62 and again from 1964 to 1968 railways were built, lumbering districts set apart, and saw-mills supplying timber for the deforested Middle Kingdom multiplied. At the same time Chinese in-migrants turned the Oroqon in their autonomous county from a 100% majority into a 0.5% minority. Population density increased from the former 0.5 to 144 persons per square kilometer signaling an end to the days of an untouched reserve.

After the Cultural Revolution with its increasing in-migration the minority took stock: Apart from state organized migration, until 1980 some 28,000 Chinese had come to Oroqon Autonomous County on their own to participate in the boom. Forestry had continuously reduced the booty from hunting in the Greater Khingan. At the same time Oroqon agriculture was unprofitable and led to deficits for years. Incomes could only be kept up by supporting the minority through state jobs in the forestry administration. And old scourges such as syphilis, tuberculosis and mental defects had anything but disappeared. As of 1990 Oroqon society seems to have become bifurcated. Approximately one third of the minority is better educated and thriving as state supported academics, technicians, cadres and administrative personnel. The rest is failing as peasants and seems to be unsuitable for industrial jobs. Fatal accidents, suicides and manslaughter under the influence of alcohol continue to be the major causes of death. And social success can only be garnered by the locally over 60% of Oroqon women marrying Han-Chinese in order to help them evade the birth control regulations. In consequence their fertility rates are nearly 60% higher than those of endogamous Oroqon marriages. Such developments in unison with the ubiquitous reclassification factor have swelled the ranks of the Oroqon again. Their numbers, which for a long time were stagnating between 2,000 and 3,000 people, have expanded to over 7,000.

66 Ibid.; Qiu Pu 1978, 89-90, 93; Elunchun-zu shehui lishi diaocha, I/3.
69 The Oroqon story has been reconstructed from analysis of tables 2-5,7-9 and fragmentary information in the following sources: Neimenggu zizhiqu jingji dili 1956; Sun Jingxin 1959; Jin Heyuan and Yan Ji 1963; RR, Sept 5, 1980; RR, Oct 16, 1981; ZSM, 119; Qiu Pu 1981, 74-75, 95-97; MT, No. 4/1982, 28-31; 1982RP; MY, No.6/1984;
Fortunes for the Dagur, the third component of the former Solon group of hunting tribes, seem to have been better, at least after the 17th century. This tribe is speaking a variant of the Mongol tongue. It has been claimed to be either a branch of the Mongol nation or to have descended from mongolized Khitan, the rulers of the Northeast from the 10th to the 12th centuries. Just as Evenki and Oroqon, Dagur originally settled in the upper Amur region. But in difference to the other Solon tribes, they were already half-agrarian at an early date. Their first migration to Manchuria occurred in the period 1635-43 when Abahai conquered their homeland, which on old maps still carries their name “Dauria”. Some 18,000 Dagur prisoners are supposed to have been driven to Mukden (Shenyang) to take up bondservant duty for the emerging Manchu state. During the same time the first niru for more than 5,600 Dagur was organized. Further Dagur migrations into Manchuria took place in the 1660s, when Russian Cossacks established themselves on the left bank of the Amur. Sources claim that in the various wars of the middle 17th century the Dagur lost more than two thirds of their population strength. As proficient warriors they were later dispatched all around China, wherever the Manchu rulers conducted warfare. Historical sources have them participate in more than 60 different campaigns. One of the most important ones was the final defeat of the Eleuth Mongols in Dzungaria. In the aftermath of this campaign a part of the Dagur were sent to garrison duty in the Yili valley in 1763. Similar to the Xibe of Xinjiang, they have kept their own settlement and a strong sense of identity there ever since.70

As agriculturists the Dagur seem to have prospered more than the nomadic Evenki and Oroqon tribes. Russian officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway estimated that in the 1880s around 29,000 Dagur lived in Heilongjiang, while another 1,000 settled as military colonists in far-away Xinjiang. Contrary to the stagnation of the other tribes, Dagur must have multiplied in the republican era, too. The various republican sources quoted in table 1 indicate a continuous growth, but a Japanese number of 300,000 Dagur for 1939 seems inflated.71 Growth persisted after the founding of the People’s Republic, helping them to increase to more than 120,000 by 1990. Considering the base number that around 1660 by and large was equal to the other small nationalities, this is not a mean feat. Looking at the average rates of increases calculated in table 3, there is the striking phenomenon of much more balanced increase without the wild fluctuations of most of the other Northeastern minorities. Dagur growth rates mostly are within a range that can be explained by natural increase due to high fertility and lower mortality. This is a further hint to the greater inner stability of this group and the absence of large-scale reclassification.

Presently, 59% of all Dagur live in the old Buteha region, which is now a part of Hulunbuir league of Inner Mongolia. 35% settle in neighboring areas of Heilongjiang, 4% in the Yili district of Xinjiang. After the final abolishment of the Solon designation in 1957, Dagur were recognized as a nationality different from Evenki and Oroqon. In 1958 they were awarded with the establishment of Mori Daba Dagur Autonomous County of Inner Mongolia in the area of their greatest concentration.72 Here they seem to have profited from this arrangement: Table 8 clearly demonstrates that in matters of employment the Dagur of Inner Mongolia get a far better deal than their relatives across the Heilongjiang border. But just as Evenki and Oroqon, Dagur have had to comply with a great influx of Chinese settlers. These have been present in the Dagur heartland of the middle Nonni river region ever since the first two decades of this century when their numbers tripled.73 In recent times, the biggest wave of in-migration started around 1970. As shown in table 6 it more than doubled the population numbers in the autonomous county and reduced the Dagur share to less than 10% of the total.

Another small Tungus nation, the Hezhe fishing and hunting in the Sungari-Amur-Ussuri river triangle, again faces big structural problems and seems to be maladapted to modern times. Just as Oroqon and Evenki they presumably were part of those “Wild Jurchen” that lived to the North of their more acculturated Manchu cousins in Ming times. And similar to the other Tungus tribes, too, they serve as an example for an uncompleted process of manchurization. Although the first niru appeared in the region already in the mid 17th century, and Hezhe were later granted the same rights as the Manchu, they yet were distinguished as a separate group.74 Hezhe, also called Nanai or Goldi,

71 Fochler-Hauke 1941, 355.
72 Dawoer-zu jianshi 1986, 56; 1982RP; 1990RP
73 Dawoer-zu jianshi 1986, 106.
have been closely studied by Russian explorers and anthropologists who traveled in the Ussuri region in the early 20th century. Three decades earlier, in 1885, the Chinese government had sent a secret mission to their area of settlement for reconnaissance at the volatile Sino-Russian border. That mission reported on the existence of 11,000 to 14,000 Hezhe living on both banks of the Sungari and Ussuri rivers, a number which fitted with the Russian reports. But less than 20 years later the Hezhe had dwindled to only 1,000 to 1,400 individuals living in China, with another 3,000 settling beyond the border on Russian territory.

One of the most informative reports on them emanated from a field study conducted by anthropologists of the Academia Sinica in 1930 who recorded the vanishing oral literature, shaman practices and social customs of the group. Another valuable report was written by the Austrian physician Jettmar who visited them in 1928. These two field studies agreed on a rapid decline of the Hezhe caused by nutritional deficiency, poverty, alcoholism, opium addiction and bad health. Venereal diseases, smallpox and tuberculosis were widespread, fertility was low and infant mortality amounted to ca. 50%. Many women intermarried with Chinese, and there were only few individuals of pure Hezhe blood.

Only 450 Hezhe were counted in the first census of 1953, and this number had increased to about 800 in 1978 with successively decreasing growth rates over the years. Although material conditions improved after the revolution, the gap to the Chinese standard of living remained. Nevertheless, Hezhe fared better than their Oroqon relatives, because as fishermen their natural habitat did not need to be as extended. Today, the group seems to be split on the same pattern as Evenki or Oroqon. The share of people with higher education levels is well above average, and so are the percentages for white-collar professions. At the same time, however, the census results of 1990 allow us to induce that on the other side of the spectrum illiteracy is above average, too. As the age structure of Hezhe shows smaller cohorts of children and youth than in the case of other Tungus minorities, the more than fivefold increase of this group between 1978 and 1990 is predominantly due to reclassification. Motives and mechanisms for this act seem to be the familiar ones.

The low proportion of children among the Hezhe is untypical. With few exceptions, the share of children and youth among minorities today is greater than among the Han majority - a product of higher fertility and the preferential birth control policies of the state during recent years. In the past the reverse held true: Due to a general backwardness with elevated mortality levels, the minority growth rates during the 1953-64 intercensal period were only one third of Han growth. Today, this high mortality is still reflected in the generally lower proportion of old people among the minorities. It shows up in age-pyramids that in the upper age-groups are highly distorted. Evenki, Dagur and Mongols in particular display this characteristic. It can only be interpreted as traces of widely fluctuating vitality rates due to the ravages of former times. Also, there is a general predominance of males in the cohorts above age 50. All these features are typical for pre-modern population dynamics with high fertility, high mortality, slow, irregular growth and lop-sided sex ratios in old age.

As inheritors of an empire that spanned two continents and as followers of a well-developed religious system differing from the Chinese one, as a people in possession of a literary tradition and as herdsmen well-adapted to fringe economics the Mongols mentioned above have been by far the most resistant and self-conscious nationality of the Northeast. Since their defeat by the Manchus in the 1620s and 1630s they served as part of the banner organization and a mainstay of Qing power. Mongols extended their realm to Western Manchuria in the 15th century. Although predominantly herdsmen, in the Northeast they partially took up agriculture during the 16th century. In the first half of the 18th century Barga Mongols from Russia and Outer Mongolia, as well as defeated Eleuth from Xinjiang, migrated to the Hulunbuir grasslands. And finally in 1860 a part of the Buriat Mongols from Transbaikalia also moved in. That was the height of Mongol expansion in the Northeast, for ever since the Mongols have been in constant conflict with Chinese peasants bringing their pastures under the plough. As this proved profitable, Mongolian nobility itself invited the settlers in order to draw rents from them. In 1791 the prince of the Gorlos Mongols is on the record as being the first to bring Chinese peasants to his banner lands. Chinese migration to Northeastern Mongol lands continued in the 19th century, it exploded in scope with the advent of the 20th century. This provoked a long chain of Mongol uprisings against Chinese settlement. They started in 1902 in the Jerim
league, spread soon to the Hulunbuir area, culminated in the declaration of independence of Outer Mongolia and fueled the various Inner Mongolian movements under Japanese auspices.\textsuperscript{79}

While Mongols protested what they felt to be economic and cultural dispossession, they at the same time suffered from a lack of manpower due to slow population growth or even long-term stagnation and decline. The extent of this stagnation or decline is hard to assess. Although it has been documented in a number of regions and become a widespread notion, it does not quite fit with the high census results for the Mongol population in the period of the People’s Republic. Processes of assimilation surely have also affected the Mongols. Yet, as indicated in table 3, they do not seem to have reached quite the same extent as in the case of the Tungus nationalities. Table 4 tries to sketch a tentative outline of Mongol development from the 17th to the early 20th centuries. It reckons with a sizable number of Mongol bannermen leaving Manchuria with the conquering Qing army in 1644. After that date a very small rate of increase is projected until reaching the 1939 figure of 1.036 Mio. This Japanese number in itself is dubious as the Manchukuo authorities and Japanese sources presented a set of highly contradictory figures for Xing'an province during the 1930s, ranging from a low of 0.550 million to a high of 1.645 million Mongols and a total population between 0.919 million in 1933 and 1.803 million in 1939.\textsuperscript{80} As witnessed by table 1, Chinese experts also came up with highly diverse estimates. At proclamation of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in 1947 only population totals were given.\textsuperscript{81}

Data for demographic development of the Mongols after 1953 are more reliable. But they suffer from the difficulty of separating the Northeastern leagues from the rest of Inner Mongolia. Because the various natural and economic subregions within Inner Mongolia differ sharply, this can be a crucial obstacle for analyzing ethnic composition and socio-economic traits. Table 6 succeeds in showing that Mongols had already become a minority in the Xing’an province of Manchukuo, which is largely identical with the present four Northeastern leagues. Afterwards the Mongol share of total population dropped further, but then it held out. Since 1982 it has even slightly recovered. Data for the educational level and employment shares of Mongols in the Northeastern leagues are lacking. But tables 7 and 8 show the situation of Mongols residing in Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. They point to the fact of their very low educational standard. No matter if compared to the Han majority or to other minorities, Mongols always are on the low end of the ranking order. This seems to be both connected with their rural character and the high numbers involved. Obviously, it is easier to spread schooling among small nationalities of a few thousand people than among the Mongols surpassing the 3 million mark. Table 8 reflects the same structural problems from a different angle. Mongols are shown to have low shares of white-collar positions, they seem to be averse to trading and services, are underrepresented among industrial and transportation workers. Of all the nationalities of Manchuria they are still the most rural in character.

The Immigrants

While the study of demographic developments among the natives of Manchuria remains in its infancy, migration into the region has been widely analyzed and commented upon.\textsuperscript{82} This is why in the following only a brief outline will be given.


\textsuperscript{80} Wang Shida 1935, 240-242; Hokuman keizai chosajo 1941, 78-79; Guomin zhengfu zhujichu 1940, 168-169; Miyakawa Zenzo 1941, 74; Heissig 1941, 57; Fochler-Hauke 1941, 268-276, 355-359; Shen Binhua 1982, 215.

\textsuperscript{81} Clubb 1954, 39.

\textsuperscript{82} For the Qing period see Lee 1970, 78-115; Lu Yu 1987. For the republican era the following sources were checked: Young 1929; Chen Hanseng 1930; Mantetsu chosaka 1931; Jiang Wenhan 1931; Ho 1931; Taeuber 1974; Lee Chong-sik 1983, 18-24; Lu Yu 1985; Cui Yuliang 1985, 45. For Manchukuo: Hokuman keizai chosajo 1939; Miyakawa Zenzo 1941; Chao Kang 1982.
Chinese migration to the Northeast went through different phases.\(^83\) Manchuria right after the conquest of China was depopulated. The first two Manchu emperors of China therefore fostered Chinese in-migration with various economic privileges. These measures are judged to have drawn a rather modest number of approximately 0.31 million people to Liaoning. Privileges were nullified in 1668, but in-migration kept being permitted. The policy of closing Manchuria to Chinese in-migration was initiated under the Yongzheng emperor in 1722 and endorsed by several edicts of emperor Qianlong between 1740 and 1776. But even this energetic ruler had to concede that closure did not fully succeed. Twice Qianlong permitted migration of drought afflicted peasants from North China to Southern Manchuria, and in 1776 he bemoaned that his ban on migration was not heeded as far as Liaodong was concerned. The Qing emperors themselves undermined their policy by sending political exiles and criminal convicts from China to work as bondservants on the Manchurian estates. Starting already in the 17th century, a host of illegal migrants also trickled into the Northeast to seek ginseng, dig gold-mines, sell opium and trade in furs. In the 18th century migration picked up, with Chinese peasants converging on the Mongol territories just outside the Great Wall. After the Opium Wars and the Taiping Uprising the policy of closure was hardly enforced any more. At various times between 1861 and 1902 large tracts of Heilongjiang and Jilin were opened for settlement. In the late 1880s the authorities finally ceased applying the policy of closure altogether. The construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway between 1898 and 1903, the enlargement of the Dairen docks and Port Arthur, the soybean boom and the first industries of the Northeast drew further Chinese migrants to the area. The whole former government policy came down, when it was decided to populate Inner Mongolia and Manchuria as a safeguard against Russian and Japanese encroachments. After 1907 a mad scramble for land began. During the last years of its reign the Qing government planned to settle 2 million Chinese in the Northeast.

In the first decade of the 20th century Chinese migration to the Judda league increased dramatically. Land reclamation was also taken up on the right bank of the Amur, in the Mudanjiang area and in the Mongol banners between Qiqihar and Harbin. The method used was nationalization of Mongol lands, compensational payments to the Mongol nobility, limited allotments to Mongol commoners and open sale of the remaining countryside with five-year tax holidays. All republican governments from Yuan Shikai to Zhang Zuolin and the Guomindang hastened the land reclamation. Crop failures and civil wars in North China furthered the run to the Northeast even more. With more than 70% of the predominantly male migrants, Shandong province, followed with great distance by Hebei and Henan, proved to be the most enduring supplier of manpower. From 1912 to 1938 many new railway lines were opened in the Northeast with the stated purpose of promoting Chinese migration.\(^84\) They drew large numbers of migrants away from Southern Manchuria to the virgin lands of the North, where 35% (Jilin) to 71% (Heilongjiang) of the potential land resources were unreclaimed and where the land-man ratios were twice to six times as large as the minuscule averages of North China (0.20 ha for Shandong, 0.39 ha for Liaoning and 1.25 ha for Heilongjiang around 1933).\(^85\)

As shown by the figures in table 9, the 1920s were a peak period of in-migration. The Japanese authorities in the main migrant port of Dairen and along the South Manchurian Railway conducted detailed surveys at that time. They showed a high seasonal fluctuation of migrants, with many of them returning home during winter time. Whereas in the early 1920s the majority came to work on the docks, the railway lines, the mines and the infant industries, the number of impoverished peasants seeking reclaimable land increased later on. 50-70% of them proceeded to northern Manchuria. While in-migration abated after the Japanese occupation of 1931, it reincreased after 1937 due to the manpower needs of the giant industries constructed by the occupants.\(^86\)

During the first half of the 20th century push and pull factors worked hand in glove to speed up spontaneous migration. This was supposed to have changed after the establishment of the People’s Republic which stressed...
organized migration forms. From 1950 to 1960 millions of skilled workers and technicians from the core areas of China were transferred to Manchuria, in order to man the heavy industry complexes left by the Japanese and to push ahead the big investment projects of the First Five-Year Plan. Between 1952 and 1958 organized land-reclamation in Heilongjiang increased with the usual set of Shandong, Hebei and Henan peasants in the fore. Other migrants manned newly constructed mines, joined in the campaign to develop the Greater Khingan forestry reserves and reclaimed the vast barren lands of the Three River Triangle. After 1960 demobilized soldiers, technicians and graduates were dispatched to the newly developed Daqing oil-field. During the late 1960s and the 1970s state and army farms received about half a million resettled youth from the big Chinese cities, who were to establish their revolutionary credentials through hard work on the frontier land. These various population movements were perceived as socialist labor allocation. They were carried on in mass-campaign style and were characterized by a strong compulsory element.

Nevertheless, new research from China has revealed that spontaneous migration continued to play a prominent role. According to China’s leading expert in migration studies, it amounted to yearly averages of gross nearly 0.2 million, net 0.15 million migrants to Heilongjiang, equal to 64% of total net in-migration into that province between 1953 and 1982. Never reported but tacitly condoned, unorganized migration of individual peasants apparently played the role of a safety valve for the densely populated regions of North China. And apart from Heilongjiang it affected Inner Mongolia, too. When during the political liberalization of 1980 it finally came out as an issue for public discussion, it immediately provoked the familiar Mongol protest against the Chinese hunger for land. The Party’s response to criticism at the National People’s Congress was equally in line with historical continuity: During its July session of 1981 dedicated to the discussion of Inner Mongolian problems the Party secretariat finally abandoned further state organized migration to the region. But it ordered Inner Mongolia not to block individual peasant movement from China.

The largely unorganized character of migration during the first half of the 20th century, the ups and downs of the various mass-campaigns during the first decades of the People’s Republic and the almost clandestine character of spontaneous migration during that period render it difficult to collect concise figures. Table 9 is an attempt to combine the pile of disjointed information into a coherent whole. For 1915-1937 it makes use of the various accounts of Chinese labor migration to Manchuria published between 1929 and 1985. Their figures never totally tally. But the divergences seem to be negligible enough to present one set of figures in the table. After 1949 statistics become both more precise and more confusing. Numbers presented here are constructed by using the residual method (comparing total population growth with rates of natural increase and interpreting the difference as migration). This method is different from the Japanese surveys in the 1920s and 1930s which asked migrants about their place of origin and their final destination. Whereas the Japanese survey design answered the question about the total volume of in-migration to Manchuria, the residual method only allows for balances on the province level. As it does not distinguish interregional from intraregional migration, no combined total for the whole Northeast can be constructed.

Nevertheless, the figures show some remarkable trends: Heilongjiang continues to be the main frontier of Chinese migration, surpassing Liaoning from which the North probably has drawn additional manpower, too. Overall, Heilongjiang takes in four times the number of migrants that are headed for the Northeastern leagues of Inner Mongolia. In-migration is heavy during the First Five-Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward where it even surpasses the large totals for the 1920s. It recedes dramatically during the crisis years of the 1960s, only to jump up again during the Cultural Revolution. Ever since the beginning of the reform period Heilongjiang and Jilin have experienced net out-migration, while Liaoning seems to have received back many migrants it sent off in former times. This is indicative of the liberalization of movement within China, and it also documents the income-induced pull of the coastal and urban areas.

Chinese settlement has dwarfed all other attempts at in-migration. It has effectively crowded out the Russians who started to cross the Amur in the 19th century and poured into the region in great numbers after the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. With a Harbin population share of 64% in 1912 they made that place into a more or

88 Ma Xia 1986.
less Russian city. Until 1928 Russians in Harbin grew to nearly 110,000. And during the civil war between Bolsheviks and Whites the number of Russians in Manchuria increased to a maximum of perhaps 0.25 million exiles and fugitives in 1928. The diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government by China in 1924 and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in later years all worked to reduce this number fast. By 1935 Russians in Harbin had shrunk to 23,000 persons above 17 years of age. Most Russians emigrated to third countries, others went back to their homeland when the Soviet army occupied Manchuria in 1945. Only a tiny number of 4,876 Russians, 90% of them in the Manzhouli-Hailar region of Inner Mongolia, were enumerated in the whole Northeast during the last census of 1990.90 In view of the Sino-Soviet conflict, most of them had not dared to profess their nationality before.

No traces are left of the Japanese colonization. It started with the Japanese military which in 1905 took possession of the South Manchurian Railway Zone and the Guandong leasehold with Port Arthur and Dairen. The employees of the South Manchurian Railway Company and of the many Japanese consulates soon multiplied, individual Japanese traders, tailors and innkeepers spread North up to Harbin and beyond. The rosters for 1931 showed approximately 0.24 million Japanese, about 50% of them living in the Guandong leasehold, 42% in the Railway Zone and 4% in Heilongjiang. It all changed with the occupation of Manchuria. By 1945 the number had swollen to 1.32 million, among them 0.19 Mio. in Mukden (Shenyang) and most of the others in the cities along the Manchurian railway lines. A novel element were 0.12 million armed Japanese colonists who settled in Heilongjiang and Jilin in 89 land reclamation zones. They were the vanguard of a planned 5 million Japanese settlers to arrive until 1955. But ten years before that date Hiroshima and Nagasaki happened, and within less than one year after capitulation all Japanese had left Manchuria again.91

Of all rival migrant groups only the Koreans have been accepted as a permanent part of Manchuria’s population. Having lived closely together with the Northeastern peoples for centuries and having adopted Chinese culture to a large degree, they are not felt to be a completely alien element. Greater numbers of poor Korean peasants arrived in Manchuria since the 1860s due to crop failures at home. They were welcomed as experts in paddy farming and living bulwarks against Russian designs. After the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 the number of Korean refugees multiplied, later Koreans came as part of the Japanese establishment. In contrast to Russians and Japanese, Koreans were not repatriated after World War II. As demonstrated by tables 2 to 5, this minority has seen a steady development without the wild swings typical for the other groups. 43% of the Koreans live in their Yanbian Autonomous District along the Sino-Korean border, 24% in the Mudanjiang area of eastern Heilongjiang, 12% in Liaoning around Shenyang and Fushun and the rest in the Northeastern part of Inner Mongolia. They are a highly educated minority with an above average degree of urbanization, overrepresentation in white-collar professions and a demographic transition to low mortality and fertility levels almost completed.92

Summary

What then is the lesson of the Manchurian story told here? Totaling the numbers in table 9 and rounding them up to include periods not covered brings out the salient fact that Chinese net-migration to the Northeast in the 20th century has brought between 16 to 20 Mio. people to the region. Building on a smaller migration stream in the two centuries before, these migrants together with their descendants have been responsible for the explosion of total population that is documented in tables 4 and 5. From the empty spaces for under 7 million people at the end of the last century the Northeast has evolved into a populated region with more than 110 million people, heavily urbanized and industrialized in the South, still thinly settled in many parts of the North, but with an end of reclaimable land resources in sight for the not too distant future. This has been a secular event of the 20th century. It has changed the ethnic composition and the political map of the area forever.

Disregarding the strong Chinese element in the Liaodong region during the late Ming period, the native population held a majority until the early 19th century. But only 100 years later the share of the Chinese had swollen to a level of about 90% where it has been staying ever since. In their historical roles as officials and educators, traders, miners and peasants the Chinese have brought both promise and curse, gratification and tragedy to the natives at the same time. The means of their official nationality policy have been time-honored since the Han period: gifts, visits and titles, military colonies and nomenclatura power over official appointments, schooling and agrarian settlement. Whereas the Mongols reacted with violence, the Tungus groups predominantly surrendered. Their population dynamics are less connected to demography in the narrow sense, they rather reflect changing power politics, social pressures and economic circumstances. These are displayed in conspicuous phenomena of submerging and resurfacing.

The recent resurgence of minority numbers is based on policy decisions which carry all the signs of compensation for wrongs of the past. It remains to be seen, however, if apart from creating social clients they can revitalize native societies and cultures that have succumbed to a dominant civilization and the overwhelming forces of modernization. Modernization and the utilization of idle resources has been the overriding concern of the Chinese. Together with population pressure, the escape from poverty and border protection it has motivated the mass migration to Manchuria. On the international level, the population weapon has been successful to such a degree that Russian observers nowadays start wondering about the consequences of Chinese migration, the beginning spill-over to Siberia and preventive measures for the Russian Far East. There is an element of irony in such considerations. For one century before the situation was just the other way round.
**Statistical Appendix:**

**Table 1:** Nationalities From Manchuria and Inner Mongolia: National Population Totals ca. 1935, Estimates From Republican Sources (Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchus</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongols</td>
<td>2.172</td>
<td>1.260</td>
<td>1.560</td>
<td>2.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagur</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenki</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oroqon</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezhe</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers refer to totals in the whole of China.


**Table 2:** Nationalities From Manchuria and Inner Mongolia: National Population Totals 1953-90, Census and Registration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchus</td>
<td>2,418,931</td>
<td>2,430,561</td>
<td>2,700,725</td>
<td>2,650,000</td>
<td>4,304,981</td>
<td>9,846,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongols</td>
<td>1,462,956</td>
<td>1,645,695</td>
<td>1,973,192</td>
<td>2,660,000</td>
<td>3,411,367</td>
<td>4,802,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>1,120,405</td>
<td>1,255,551</td>
<td>1,348,594</td>
<td>1,680,000</td>
<td>1,765,204</td>
<td>1,923,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibe</td>
<td>19,022</td>
<td>21,405</td>
<td>33,451</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>83,683</td>
<td>172,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagur</td>
<td>44,100</td>
<td>50,121</td>
<td>63,395</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>94,126</td>
<td>121,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenki</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>7,145</td>
<td>9,695</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>19,398</td>
<td>26,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oroqon</td>
<td>2,262</td>
<td>2,459</td>
<td>2,709</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>4,103</td>
<td>7,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezhe</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>4,254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers refer to totals in the whole of China.

### Table 3: Nationalities From Manchuria and Inner Mongolia: Population Increase in All China, Annual Averages 1953-90 (‰)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchus</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>148.7</td>
<td>109.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongols</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibe</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>201.6</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagur</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenki</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>121.1</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oroqon</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezhe</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>194.4</td>
<td>140.2</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Calculated from numbers in table 2

### Table 4: Total Population of Manchuria and Northeastern Mongolia by Nationalities: Estimates 1640-1939 (Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Hui</th>
<th>Manchu</th>
<th>Xibe</th>
<th>Evenki</th>
<th>Oroqon</th>
<th>Hezhe</th>
<th>Mongol</th>
<th>Dagur</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ca.1640</td>
<td>4.500</td>
<td>3.390</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca.1660</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca.1790</td>
<td>2.016</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca.1890</td>
<td>6.813</td>
<td>4.505</td>
<td>1.744</td>
<td>1.531</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.639</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca.1910</td>
<td>20.436</td>
<td>17.844</td>
<td>36.575</td>
<td>1.692</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>1.162</td>
<td>1.319</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca.1939</td>
<td>43.035</td>
<td>36.575</td>
<td>43.035</td>
<td>2.677</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.036</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>1.162</td>
<td>1.319</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers refer to the present provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang plus the Northeastern leagues of Inner Mongolia (Jo-uda, Jerim, Xing’an, Hulunbuir)

Sources:
1640: Total: Song Zexing 1987, 34-35 (for Liaoning); extrapolations from Zhao Wenlin 1988, 443-445 (for Jilin and Heilongjiang); plus extrapolation for Northeastern Mongolia
Chinese: residual
Manchu: estimated from numbers of Manchu bannermen in Peng Bo 1985, 33; Liu Qingxiang and Wang Yuanqing 1991; Li Xinda 1982
Xibe: extrapolation from number of Xibe resettled to Xinjiang in Xibo-zu jianshi 1986, 1,41-57, and from regional composition of Xibe population in 1982
Mongol: extrapolation from number of Mongols in Liaoning in Song Zexing 1987, 35-36
Dagur: estimated from Dawoer-zu jianshi 1986, 47; Dawoer-zu shenhui lishi diaocha 1985, 14
1660: Total: Zhao Wenlin 1988, 443-445; plus estimate for Mongols in Northeastern Mongolia
Chinese: residual
Manchu: estimated by accounting for Manchu migration to China Proper; cf. Li Xinda 1982; Song Zexing 1987, 35
Xibe: as for 1640
Evenki: estimated from number of Solon bannermen in Ewenke-zu zizhixian gaikuang 1987, 24-25; Dawoer-zu jianshi 1986, 48
Oroqon: as for Evenki
Mongols: estimated by subtracting approximately 0.1 Mio. Mongols migrated to China proper; cf. Li Xinda 1982; Song Zexing 1987, 35
Dagur: as for 1640
1790: Total: Zhao Wenlin 1988, 443-445; plus estimate for Chinese migrants and Mongols in Northeastern Mongolia
Xibe: as for 1640
Evenki: as for 1660
Oroqon: as for 1660
Mongols: estimate by assuming natural increase of 0.15% p.a. and in-migration of Barga and Eleuth Mongols; cf. also population numbers for Eastern leagues in Song Naigong 1987, 47
Dagur: estimated from number of Solon and Dagur bannermen in Ewenke-zu zizhixian gaikuang 1987, 24-25; Dawoer-zu jianshi 1986, 48
1890: Total: Zhao Wenlin 1988, 443-445; plus estimate for Mongols in Northeastern Mongolia
Chinese: residual
Manchu: Liu Qingxiang and Wang Yuanqing 1991
Xibe, Evenki: as for 1640 or 1660
Oroqon: Zhao Fengcai 1988
Hezhe: Ling Chunsheng 1934, I/59; Shirokogoroff 1926, 128
Mongols: estimated by assuming natural increase of 0.15% p.a.
Korean: estimated from numbers in Fu Langyun and Yang Yang 1983, 164
Dagur: Dawoer-zu jianshi 1986, 56
1910: Total: Zhao Wenlin 1988, 443-445; plus estimate for Mongols in Northeastern Mongolia
Chinese: residual
Manchu: estimated from 1890 assuming 0.5% natural increase p.a.
Xibe: as for 1640
Evenki: estimated from 1890 assuming -2.5% decline p.a.
Oroqon: Elunchun jianshi 1983, 4
Hezhe: ZS,57; Shirokogoroff 1925, 28
Mongols: estimated by assuming natural increase of 0.15% p.a.
Dagur: as for 1890
Korean: Jiang Wenhan 1931, 187
Japanese: Jiang Wenhan 1931, 173-178
Russian: Shi Fang 1986
Table 5: **Total Population of Manchuria and Northeastern Mongolia by Nationalities:**
Census Numbers 1940-1990 (Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42.652</td>
<td>47.430</td>
<td>68.766</td>
<td>100.719</td>
<td>110.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>36.360</td>
<td>43.412</td>
<td>63.308</td>
<td>92.129</td>
<td>96.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>2.561</td>
<td>1.113</td>
<td>2.208</td>
<td>3.607</td>
<td>7.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibe</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenki</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oroqon</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezhe</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>1.036</td>
<td>1.059</td>
<td>1.445</td>
<td>2.461</td>
<td>3.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagur</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>1.452</td>
<td>1.150</td>
<td>1.330</td>
<td>1.748</td>
<td>1.897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers refer to the present provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang including former Rehe province plus the northeastern leagues of Inner Mongolia (Jo-uda, Jerim, Xing’an, Hulunbuir). They are adjusted by excluding Chengde prefecture, subordinated to Hebei in 1954. The 1940 Manchukuo census listed only Chinese, Manchu, Mongols, Koreans and Japanese. 1940 data for the Manchu are adjusted by a separate listing of Dagur and the small Tungus tribes. Data for these nationalities hail from various sources, for the Dagur they result from extrapolation of 1910 and 1953 figures. The unadjusted 1940 census figure for the Manchu including related “other” nationalities amounts to 2.677 million.

Table 6: Minority Autonomous Areas of the Northeast: Titular Minorities as Percentage of Total Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Total Population (Mio.)</th>
<th>Titular Minority (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xiuyan Manchu Autonomous County, Liaoning</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fengcheng Manchu Autonomous County, Liaoning</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinbin Manchu Autonomous County, Liaoning</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenki Autonomous Banner, Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oroqon Autonomous Banner, Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xing'an Mongol Province, Manchukuo</td>
<td>1.513</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four North-Eastern Leagues</td>
<td>3.677</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Gorlos Mongol Autonomous Banner, Jilin</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mori Daba Dagur Autonomous Banner, Inner</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanbian Korean Autonomous District, Jilin</td>
<td>0.926</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changbai Korean Autonomous County, Jilin</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Calculated from numbers in: LN; JL; NM; Neimenggu zizhi jingji dili 1957; Peng Bo 1985, 34; Song Naigong 1987, 199-205; Cao Mingguo 1988, 330; Ewenke-zu zizhiqu gaikuang 1987, 41; GR, Aug 8, 1958; Zhongguo shaoshu minzu 1961; ZMT, 42; Elunchu-zu shehui lishi diaocha, I/3; ZS; Xinhua, June 7, 1985; Fochler-Hauke 1941, 357-358; ZS

26
Table 7: **Educational Level of Nationalities in Manchuria and Northeastern Mongolia 1990 (% of Population)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Senior High</th>
<th>Junior High</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>33,293,782</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>22,134,425</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>33,217,300</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>4,954,271</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>1,054,535</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>1,191,577</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>120,196</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>3,452</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>9,002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenki</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>2,613</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>23,379</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oroqon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>3,618</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>3,110</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezhe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>3,759</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongols</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>587,311</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>156,488</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>139,077</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>42,319</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>71,484</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>230,719</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>1,183,567</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>454,091</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
<td>4,388</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No numbers from Inner Mongolia organized by leagues are available. Figures for Inner Mongolia are therefore only presented for those nationalities of whom a concentration in the Northeastern leagues is known.

Sources: Calculated from data in LN, JL, HLJ, NM.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Han</th>
<th>Manchu</th>
<th>Xibe</th>
<th>Evenki</th>
<th>Mongols</th>
<th>Koreans</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Heze</th>
<th>Dagur</th>
<th>Mongols</th>
<th>Koreans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,114,633</td>
<td>11,570,208</td>
<td>16,471,794</td>
<td>2,611,037</td>
<td>512,768</td>
<td>582,944</td>
<td>60,513</td>
<td>8,402</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>313,893</td>
<td>65,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No numbers from Inner Mongolia organized by leagues are available. Figures for Inner Mongolia are therefore only presented for those nationalities of whom a concentration in the northeastern leagues is known.

Sources: Calculated from data in LN, JL, HLJ, NM.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Liaoning</th>
<th>Jilin</th>
<th>Heilongjiang</th>
<th>Northeast Mongolia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1915-22</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-29</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-37</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-43</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-52</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-60</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.109 (1953-58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-68</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.057 (1964-82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-78</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-93</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Other sources for 1920-37 have differing numbers for individual years but end up with roughly the same annual averages: Young 1929; Chen Hanseng 1930; Mantetsu chosaka 1931; Jiang Wenhan 1931; Ho 1931; Hokuman keizai chosajo 1939; Miyakawa Zenzo 1941; Lu Yu 1985. Rival migration numbers for 1954-87 hailing from Chinese population registration records cannot be used since they do not separate inter-provincial from intra-provincial migration.

Sources: 1915-37 calculated from gross migration numbers in Cui Yuliang 1985, 45; 1950-93 calculated by residual method from total population and rate of natural increase in LNTN 1994, JLTN 1994, HLJTN 1994; figures for Northeastern Mongolia calculated from total population of the Northeastern leagues of Inner Mongolia and the rate of natural increase for all of Inner Mongolia from Song Naigong 1987, 69-70, 199-205.
Bibliography:


Arsenjew: Arsenjew, Wladimir K., Russen und Chinesen in Osttsibirien, Reiseberichte von 1906-17, Berlin n.d.

BR: Beijing Rundschau, Beijing


Brunnert and Hagelstrom (1912): Brunnert, H.S., and Hagelstrom, V.V., Present Day Political Organization of China, Shanghai 1912.


Elunchun-zu jianshi (A Short History of the Oroqon Nationality), Hohhot 1983.


Franke (1911): Franke, Otto, Ostasiatische Neubildungen, Beiträge zum Verständnis der politischen und kulturellen Entwicklungs-Vorgänge im Fernen Osten, Hamburg 1911.


GR: Guangming ribao (Enlightenment Daily), Beijing 1950-.


Lu Yu (1987): Lu Yu, Qingdai he mingdu Shandong yimin Dongbei shilue (A Short History of Migration From Shandong to Northeastern China During the Qing- and Republican Periods), Shanghai 1987.


Mantetsu chosaka (1931): Mantetsu chosaka (Research Office of the South-Manchurian Railway), ed., Manshu dekasegi iju kanmin no kazuteki koza (A Quantitative Examination of Han Migrant Workers in Manchuria), Dairen 1931.

Man-zu jianshi (A Short History of the Manchu Nationality), Beijing 1979.


Minzu gongzuo shouce (Handbook of Nationality Policies), Kunming 1985.

Miyakawa Zenzo (1941): Miyakawa Zenzo, Manshukoku no enzoku fukugo jotai (The Composition of Manchuria’s Population), Xinjing 1941.

MT: Minzu tuanjie, Beijing 1958-66, 1979-.

MY: Minzu yanjiu, Beijing 1958-66, 1979-.


Qiu Pu (1956): Qiu Pu, Elunchunren (The Oroqon), Beijing 1956.


RR: Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), Beijing 1948-.


Xibo-zu jianshi (A Short History of the Xibe Nationality), Beijing 1986.


ZSM: Guojia minwei (State Nationalities Commission), ed., Zhongguo shaoshu minzu (China’s Minorities), Beijing 1981.